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Review Essay 
Learning Contracts through Current Events:  
Lawrence Cunningham’s Contracts in the 
Real World:  Stories of Popular Contracts 
and Why They Matter
Miriam A. Cherry*
In his recent book published by Cambridge University Press, Professor 
Lawrence Cunningham explores the nuances of contract law through 
current events.1  His decision to use the contracts of modern-day singers, 
actors, and entertainers to illustrate contract law principles is an inspired 
choice that will appeal to today’s law students.  The book guides the reader 
down the well-trodden path of classic contract doctrines and applies those 
classics in modern, celebrity-laden contexts.  In this regard, the book reads 
like an updated version of Marvin Chirelstein’s classic contracts primer2—
an easy-to-read and clearly written commentary.  Cunningham’s version 
adds rollicking celebrity stories to the mix, simultaneously educating and 
entertaining the reader.  Both students and contract law experts will find 
much here to enjoy, and find new stories that appeal as much as the old 
common law chestnuts.  But, perhaps because of the broad appeal and 
audience to which the book is aimed, there may be too optimistic a view 
about the received wisdom of contract law, inasmuch as existing doctrines 
have not addressed many of the new consumer law issues raised by modern 
technology.   
In this review essay, I first start with a brief summary of Professor 
Cunningham’s book and how I believe it will appeal to a wide audience.  In 
the second portion of the review, I focus on Cunningham’s thesis about 
contract law, to wit, his view that contract law doctrine as it is currently 
constituted has struck an appropriate balance between the formalists and 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University; B.A., 1996, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1999, 
Harvard Law School.  Thanks to Matthew Bodie, Leah Chan Grinvald, Anders Walker, and 
Jarrod Wong for their helpful comments, and to Jacob Hollars for his excellent help as my 
research assistant. 
1 LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR 
CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY MATTER (2012). 
2 MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
(6th ed. 2010). 
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realists.  In other words, Cunningham argues that modern contract law 
allows for the advancement of individual autonomy, but at the same time 
that current doctrine allows for appropriate court intervention to police 
overreaching or other problems with the bargain.  In the third portion, I 
explain why, despite all the best intentions of the author, I find myself only 
partially persuaded by the optimistic view of existing contract doctrine.   
In my view, modern technology has exacerbated many of the existing 
tensions within contract law, stretching the concept of mutual assent to its 
outer limits to cover methods of transacting like clickwraps and 
browsewraps.  Further, these tensions are not necessarily reducible to the 
formalist-realist dichotomy on which Cunningham focuses.  Despite this 
divergence, I conclude that Professor Cunningham has taken on a subject of 
surprising scope and breadth and made his obvious joy and excitement in 
writing about contract law fully accessible to a wide audience.  Along the 
way, he holds the reader’s attention and illuminates the overarching 
doctrinal themes of contract law. 
I. SUMMARY OF CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD
After a general introduction to the field of contract law, as well as a list 
of celebrities that the reader will meet throughout the book, the table of 
contents lists contract formation, defenses, remedies, interpretation, 
performance, conditions, and ends with third parties.  The appropriate 
organization of a contracts treatise or textbook is a matter of longstanding 
debate amongst contracts scholars.  Some professors begin a class by 
teaching remedies, others with consideration, and others still with offer and 
acceptance.3  Despite this ongoing pedagogical debate, the organizational 
structure that Professor Cunningham has selected is logical and works well 
even if some might prefer a different order of topics.  Only on a rare 
occasion was there any reason to question the book’s placement of a story 
or an issue.    
 In the first chapter, concerning formation, the stories immediately 
grabbed the reader’s attention, turning ancient questions over consideration 
3 Professor Lon Fuller suggested that students begin their study of contract law with 
damages, so that they would understand the consequences of what it meant to breach a 
contract.  See Scott D. Gerber, Corbin and Fuller’s Cases on Contracts (1942?): The 
Casebook That Never Was, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (2003).  Other professors (myself 
included), begin with contract formation, because students find it easier to understand breach 
and damages if they first understand how a contract comes into existence, and what types of 
promises will be legally enforced.  I have often said that in some sense it does not make 
much difference at what point one begins one’s study of contracts, because it all wraps 
around again, like the mythical serpent eating its own tail. 
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and the necessity of a bargain into a lively discussion of the ownership of 
the archives of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.4  Reading the 
chapter provides an insight into the ambiguous language surrounding those 
papers left with Boston University, which had awarded him the degree that 
made him “Dr. King.”5  From there, Cunningham turns his attention to 
issues of offer and acceptance, mostly the question of mutual assent and 
offers made in jest, based on Leonard v. Pepsico, the recent “Pepsi Points” 
for a harrier jet case.6  The chapter finishes with a discussion of mutual 
assent, by reviewing the Peerless ship case, Raffles v. Wichelhaus,7 and then 
applying the concept of objective intent to several internet contracting 
cases, including Specht v. Netscape8 and ProCD v. Zeidenberg.9
Chapters Two and Three focus on contract defenses, including 
unconscionability, public policy, mistake, impossibility, and infancy.  
While Chapter Two starts off with an ordinary case by way of example, the 
chapter quickly moves back to more celebrity-friendly terrain.  Raising 
issues of the bounds of the law and unconscionability, the book discuses the 
attempted blackmail of entertainer David Letterman and a palimony lawsuit 
against rapper 50-Cent.10  The chapter continues with the story of a contract 
to split gambling winnings—made between two octogenarian sisters.11
Finally, the Baby M case, with its multi-dimensional discussion of contracts 
against public policy, rounds out the chapter.12  Chapter Three begins with a 
discussion of mistake, in the context of a divorce in which a portion of the 
divided joint assets disappeared in Bernard Madoff’s notorious recent Ponzi 
scheme.13  Other stories in this section use celebrity contracts to great 
4 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 11-14; King v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 647 N.E.2d 
1196 (Mass. 1995). 
5 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 12; King, 647 N.E.2d 1196. 
6 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 16-18; Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F.Supp. 2d 116, 
aff’d, 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
7 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 26; Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 
(Ct. of Exchequer); 2 Hurl. & C. 906. 
8 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 27-28; Specht v. Netscape Communications, Corp, 306 
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
9 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 28-29; ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
10 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 42, 44-47; Bill Carter & Brian Steltier, Letterman 
Extortion Raises Questions for CBS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/ 10/03/business/media/03extort.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all; Tompkins v. 
Jackson, No. 104745/2008, 2009 WL513858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2009). 
11 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 49-52; Sokaitis v. Bakaysa, 293 Conn. 17 (Conn. 
2009). 
12 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 52-58; In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
13 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 59-66; Simkin v. Blank, 80 A.D.3d 401 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2011). 
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effect.  For example, Cunningham’s discussion of impossibility includes 
Donald Trump’s attempts to cancel a contract via a force majeure clause,14
while Craig Traylor of “Malcolm in the Middle” television fame takes 
center stage in illustrating the defense of infancy.15  The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the contracts and defenses in the AIG bonus scandal16 and 
sports sponsorship contracts made by Citigroup and Enron.17
Chapters Four and Five turn to remedial issues, including expectation 
damages, reliance damages, and restitution.  Celebutante Paris Hilton plays 
a major role in this discussion, as she was alleged to be in breach for 
contracts for a movie promotional appearance as well as hair extension 
promotions.18  Cunningham uses these examples to walk through a general 
discussion of damages, which are enlivened through a recounting of some 
of Hilton’s antics. The doctrine of mitigation and the lost volume seller 
both receive a thorough and interesting treatment in the discussion of the 
Redskins football team’s decision to pursue breaching season ticket holders, 
despite the fact that some of those tickets could presumably be resold.19
The discussion of restitution revolves around the development of the hit 
television show The Sopranos, and whether one of the contributors of ideas 
had a right to share in the profits.20  The chapter ends with a discussion of 
the off-contract remedies awarded when rock singer Rod Stewart was 
unable to perform in Las Vegas due to vocal chord problems.21
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight deal with interpretation of the contract, 
the implied duty of good faith, and the effect of conditions.  Rapper 
14 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 66; Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 65 
A.D.3d 1329 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
15 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 70; Berg v. Traylor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
16 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 73-78; Lawrence A. Cunningham, A.I.G.’s Bonus 
Blackmail, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/opinion 
/18cunningham.html. 
17 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 78-83; Richard Sandomir, Citigroup Puts Its Money 
Where Its Name Will Be, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/ 
20/sports/baseball/20sandomir.html. 
18 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 84-94; Goldberg v. Paris Hilton Entm’t, Inc., No. 08-
22261-CIV, 2009 WL 2525482 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2009); Hairtech Int’l, Inc. v. Hilton, No. 
BC443465, 2010 WL 3300058 (Cal. Superior) (Trial Pleading) (Aug. 11, 2010). 
19 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 94-99; James V. Grimaldi, Washington Redskins React 
to Fans’ Tough Luck With Tough Love, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 3, 2009, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/02/AR2009090203887.html. 
20 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 118-22; Baer v. Chase, No. 02-2334, 2007 WL 
1237850 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2007). 
21 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 122-25; Rio Properties v. Armstrong Hirsch, 94 
Fed.App’x. 519 (9th Cir. 2004); Rio Properties v. Armstrong Hirsch, 254 Fed.App’x. 600 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
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Eminem’s recording contract provides an excellent illustration of what 
happens when a new technology—in this situation, ringtones and iTunes 
downloads—is invented after the contract is signed.22  How to sort out 
payment for these new technologies was the subject of a heated debate—
with Eminem’s legal fight winning him millions of dollars.23   Best efforts 
clauses are illustrated in poet Maya Angelou’s disagreement with promoter 
Butch Lewis over her agreement to license her poetry to Hallmark greeting 
cards.24 Comedian Conan O’Brien’s dispute over the change in time of his 
show is an issue that many watched closely as it unfolded, and it is used to 
discuss the concept of material breach and adjustment.25  The discussion of 
conditions benefits from the example of troubled actor Charlie Sheen, as it 
raises questions about whether particular conditions were either waived or 
estopped since the network had previously chosen to ignore his drug-fueled 
antics.26  Finally, the book ends—as most contracts books do—with the 
obligatory chapter about third-party beneficiaries.  This portion of the book 
is timely and important, thanks to its use of Wal-Mart’s ongoing labor 
disputes and discussion of how third-party beneficiary doctrine might be 
helpful in thinking through those issues.27  Overall, the book covers a vast 
scope of issues and doctrine, inviting its readers along for an exciting 
intellectual journey through the field of contract law. 
II. DIFFERING VIEWS OF CONTRACT LAW, AND PROFESSOR 
CUNNINGHAM’S ARGUMENT
Some would claim that contract law is revolutionary; others would argue 
that it is reactionary.  Compared to the status relationships of the Middle 
Ages, in which economic power was primarily determined through feudal 
or family relationships, contract and market relations promised a more 
egalitarian alternative.  In the classic text Ancient Law, Sir Henry Maine 
described the radical transformation from a feudal society governed by 
custom and hierarchy to one transformed by the industrial revolution, in 
22 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 126-30; F.B.T. Productions v. Aftermath Records, 621 
F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010). 
23 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 126-30. 
24 Id. at 148-52; B. Lewis Productions, Inc. v. Angelou, No. 06 Civ. 6390 (DLC), 2008 
WL 1826486 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2008). 
25 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 167-71; Bill Carter, Fingers Still Pointing, NBC and 
O’Brien Reach a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/ 
22/business/media/22conan.html. 
26 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 176-86; Sheen v. Lorre, No. SC111794, 2011 WL 
817781 (Cal. Superior) (Trial Pleading) (Mar. 10, 2011). 
27 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 194-98; Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
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which socio-economic mobility was not only possible, but which was 
expected.28  On the other hand, there are those who would argue that 
contract law acts as a reactionary force insofar as enforcing bargains strictly 
as written could result in reinforcing power imbalances that already exist in 
society.29
Professor Cunningham’s work notes these various arguments, and strikes 
a middle ground between them.  He characterizes the schism in contract law 
as a dispute between formalists and the realists.  This schism applies even 
to foundational matters, such as the question of whether a contract has been 
formed.  Cunningham notes that extreme formalists would champion a 
return to the days of the seal and enforce only those deals that meet the 
strict definitions of offer, acceptance, and consideration.30  Realists, on the 
other hand, favor scrutinizing the context of every bargain, accepting the 
most informal of deals and even enforcing promises to make gifts as 
contracts.31  This divide becomes both more interesting and perhaps 
controversial in examining the outer limits of acceptable contracts.  
Formalists, Cunningham notes, would like to see the ability of judges to 
scrutinize adequacy of consideration, even purely nominal consideration, 
severely circumscribed so as to expand the freedom of contract.32
Conversely, Cunningham asserts that realists would want to empower 
judges fully to scrutinize not only the adequacy of consideration, but also to 
police contracts that may violate a social norm, value, or policy.33  Thus the 
dichotomy between formalists and realists turns into a debate over the 
extent of government or court involvement in private ordering.   
Cunningham walks a tightrope between these positions, often making 
reference to contract law’s “sensible center,” and noting that with many 
common problems, the rules that have evolved over the years make a good 
deal of sense.  In essence, he makes a case for the status quo, eschewing 
reform in either the direction of more government interference in contract, 
or government withdrawal from contract.  Cunningham suggests that 
current law strikes the proper balance between two rather extreme 
positions.          
Reading Professor Cunningham’s discussion will likely be a comforting 
experience for many readers, especially law students.  While formalists and 
28 SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1886). 
29 See, e.g., Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains: 
Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925 
(2006).   
30 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 34. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 57. 
33 Id. at 57-58, 82-83, 146-47, 212. 
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realists may debate and bicker and try to push the law too far in one 
direction or another regarding government intervention, the old wisdom of 
the common law knows best.  The book extols the earthy pragmatism of old 
precedents and wise judges, and suggests that these doctrines will 
ultimately win out and reach a balance.  This soothing vision, however, 
smoothes over ongoing debates among modern contract law scholars.  
Modern technology, in particular, proves to be a particular challenge for the 
soothing discussion.   
III. MODERN TECHNOLOGY AS A CHALLENGE TO EXISTING CONTRACT 
DOCTRINE
Modern technology has exacerbated the doctrinal tensions within 
contract law.  Currently, clickwraps and browsewraps stretch the notion of 
mutual assent to its extreme, perhaps warping it in the process.  The recent 
literature on form contracting online has been substantial.34  While some of 
this literature sees online contracting as a natural inheritance to traditional 
contract law doctrine,35 other commentators have argued that contracting 
online has distorted the doctrine.36
Professor Cunningham discusses the recent cases Specht v. Netscape37
and Pro-CD v. Zeidenberg38 as part of his treatment of the theme of 
contract formation and mutual assent.  Netscape involved an instance where 
Internet users were invited to download a program without first seeing a 
license agreement or any mention of one, as it was contained on a lower 
part of the screen that could not be seen.39  When users alleged that the 
download contained spyware and filed a lawsuit, Netscape countered by 
pointing to the arbitration provision in the license.40  The Second Circuit, 
per Judge Sonia Sotomayor, held that these terms were not binding, since 
users did not have an opportunity to read the license and thus could not 
have assented to the terms.41
34 See, e.g., Nancy Kim, Internet Challenges to Business Innovation, 12 J. INTERNET L. 3 
(2008); Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2006). 
35 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinsky, Standard-Form Contracting in 
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002). 
36 See, e.g., Richard Warner, Turned on its Head?: Norms, Freedom, and Acceptable 
Terms in Internet Contracting, 11 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2008). 
37 Specht v. Netscape Communications, Corp, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
38 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
39 Netscape, 306 F.3d at 21-25. 
40 Id. at 25. 
41 Id. at 31-32. 
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In Pro-CD v. Zeidenberg the Seventh Circuit, per Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, held that the terms of use inside a software package—
commonly known as a shrink-wrap license—would be binding on the 
purchaser, Zeidenberg.42  The court reasoned that the purchaser was on 
notice that the software came with terms, even though the terms were not 
revealed at the time of purchase.43  The book reconciles these conflicting 
precedents in the following way: 
Zeidenberg’s acceptance is analogous to download offers on the Internet, 
where users are invited to click Yes to signal they accept the terms.  Cases like 
ProCD seemed to favor Netscape’s stance, but they actually support Netscape 
users’ case.  After all, in ProCD’s case, the box of software noted it was 
subject to the terms listed inside. . . . These details made ProCD an easy case 
on which to conclude that a contract was formed.  In contrast, the Netscape 
users never saw—and they could not reasonably have seen—the clause at all.  
There was no chance to click No.44
This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, as Netscape and Pro-CD are 
fundamentally in tension.  Further, given the realpolitik of adhesion 
contracts, it is difficult to say that an opportunity to “click no” would be 
anything but a distinction without a difference.  The fact is, these cases 
conflict, and do so on a pro-business versus pro-consumer axis.  In fact, two 
well-known additional cases that dealt with late-arriving terms inside a 
computer box, Hill v. Gateway45 and Klocek v. Gateway,46 blatantly 
contradict each other, with contrary holdings on virtually identical facts.  
These disputes, which are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, 
should lead to a uniform result. When instead they result in inconsistent 
holdings, it only intensifies the debate about how to deal with online 
contracting and adhesion contracts online. 
Of course, not all commentators view online contracts of adhesion 
disfavorably.47  Some authors take an explicit pro-business stance, and thus 
support contracts of adhesion as assisting businesses in becoming more 
efficient.  Others advocate that contracts of adhesion are by nature efficient 
and that cost savings will be passed along to consumers—a type of “trickle 
42 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. 
43 Id. at 1452. 
44 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 29. 
45 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).  
46 Klocek v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 104 F.Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000). 
47 Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, Symposium: A Tribute to Professor 
Joseph M. Perillo, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002).  
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down” justification for the existence of the adhesion contract.48  From a 
libertarian perspective, contracts of adhesion may be viewed as simply the 
private ordering of the market, to be left to a laissez-faire determination.49
Still others view adhesion contracts as bad, but perhaps a necessary evil.  
Some commentators point to the presence of the free market as all the 
protection that consumers need.  If the terms that one firm provides on its 
form contract are too harsh, the consumer, after all, can choose to contract 
elsewhere, at a firm offering better terms.  Perhaps, if the terms are harsh 
enough and demand is elastic enough, the consumer will choose to forgo 
contracting altogether.  To retain a competitive advantage, firms will of 
necessity have to offer terms that are more-consumer friendly. 
Professor Todd Rakoff’s germinal article on adhesion contracts, 
however, pointed to the converse trend—the tendency of form terms to 
become more entrenched, rigid, and harsh over time, despite, or perhaps 
because of, the other players in an industry.50  The harsher a drafter makes 
the terms, the more likely it is that other drafters in the same industry will 
“borrow” the same harsh terms.51  The tendency of firms to adopt a set of 
ever-harsher terms turns on its head the notion that competition will protect 
the consumer’s interests.52  Unfortunately, online terms only exacerbate the 
existing situation.  The doctrine appears rigid, almost frozen in time.   
In contrast, tort law doctrine has been capacious enough to cover related 
new developments.  When mass-market goods failed or caused serious 
injury, plaintiffs at first attempted to bring cases via the contractual doctrine 
of breach of warranty.53  These claims, however, were often stymied 
because of either lack of privity or the low damages awarded in a warranty 
action.54  Due to this inflexibility in contract law, plaintiffs instead looked 
to tort law for redress for their injuries.  Tort law was seen as less 
formalistic (in the area of consumer affairs, at least),55 and plaintiffs were 
48 Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with 
Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 255-58 
(2006); see also Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
49 Ware, supra note 48, at 259.    
50 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1228 (1983). 
51 Id. at 1226-27. 
52 Id. 
53 William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-1101 (1960). 
54 Id. at 1128-34. 
55 However, that is not the case when it comes to employment-related torts, or torts that 
an employee would bring against an employer.  The fellow-servant rule, as well as other 
rules, served as methods that effectively prevented an employee from bringing a claim 
against his or her employer.  See generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
138 University of Hawai‘i Law Review  /  Vol. 35:129 
able to bring lawsuits to seek recompense not only for the cost of their 
defective goods, but also for compensation for their injuries.  In the 1960s 
Justice Roger Traynor pioneered the field of products liability, with its 
subdivisions of design and manufacturing defect and its standard of strict 
liability.56  Under this rubric, the plaintiff need only cover the proof of the 
existence of the defect, not that the defendant knew about the concern or 
that the defendant acted without a reasonable standard of care.57  In this 
way tort law seems to have been more flexible in dealing with new claims 
than contract law has been. 
As we continue to click our way through countless EULAs and are told 
that we are subject to “terms and conditions” that no reasonable consumer 
has had the time to read, I maintain that we are obligated to make 
changes—perhaps akin to those made in the field of torts—in order to 
continue to build on the wisdom of contract law.  While there is much to 
celebrate in the received wisdom of ancient doctrines, we must also 
recognize that it is the common law’s dynamism and adaptability that have 
led to its genius. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, Contracts in the Real World is worthwhile reading for anyone 
interested in gaining a more complete understanding of contract law 
doctrine.  First year law students will find insights in the book’s inspired 
treatment of classic cases, and they will also learn how those classic cases 
can be applied to modern disputes.  The book manages to be entertaining 
without simplifying the issues being discussed.  The only aspect of debate 
is whether the book’s positive treatment of the state of current contract 
doctrine is warranted in light of recent developments in online contracting.  
While I might advocate for more change in the doctrine, Professor 
Cunningham’s view is certainly reasonable and understandable.  Overall the 
book is an excellent resource for anyone who wants to learn about contract 
law and leads the reader on an exciting intellectual journey.     
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1979).  In fact, they did so in such an effective way that an 
alternate path for bringing forward a claim, i.e. the no-fault system of worker’s 
compensation, had to be developed.  See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements To 
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997).  
56 Fleming James, Jr., A Tribute to the Imaginative Creativity of Roger Traynor, 2 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 445 (1974). 
57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965). 
